Unequal protection: Historical churches and Roma people in the Hungarian constitutional jurisprudence by Tóth, Gábor
1216-2574 / USD 20.00
© 2010 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest
ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA
51, No 2, pp. 122–135 (2010) 
DOI: 10.1556/AJur.51.2010.2.4
GÁBOR ATTILA TÓTH*
Unequal Protection: Historical Churches and Roma People 
in the Hungarian Constitutional Jurisprudence
Abstract. Treating people as equals is one of the main aims of constitutional democracies. Numerous examples 
prove the adverse effects if a state violates the equality principles relating to ethnic minorities and religious groups. 
Here is a lesson from Hungary. The Hungarian Constitutional Court (hereinafter: HCC) is not engaged in 
adjudicating concrete ‘cases and controversies’, but seemingly reviews the constitutionality of laws. The 
Constitution lays down the fundamental tenets relating to religious groups, churches, ethnic minorities and the 
principles of equality in general. Thus, the question is how the problems of religions and minorities are reﬂ ected in 
the constitutional case-law.
The main theses of this article are following. First, based on historical facts the HCC provides preferential 
treatment for so-called historical churches. Second, in cases involving Roma the HCC does not consider the 
historical facts and social reality thus, the discrimination of Roma does not appear in the jurisprudence. Third, the 
unequal protection of churches and Roma by the state results in advantages being provided where the constitutional 
reasons of preferential treatment are absent while the state remains inactive where the promotion of the principles 
of equality would be most necessary. 
Keywords: constitutional interpretation, freedom of religion, equality principle, indirect discrimination, Roma 
people
Introduction
Hungary has been a constitutional democracy for twenty years. The republic created by the 
constitutional amendments of 1989 is based upon the acknowledgment of fundamental 
rights and the rule of law. Hungarian democracy is characterized by the main institutions of 
constitutionalism: a parliamentary system, a President of the Republic with constrained 
powers, ombudsmen who guard fundamental rights and the HCC, which reviews the laws 
for their constitutionality.
Like in other Eastern European countries, the Hungarian form of the judicial protection 
of the constitution is closer the centralized German model than to the diffuse U. S. judicial 
review. By that I mean that the HCC is institutionally separated from the ordinary court 
system and has unique, erga omnes constitutional interpretative authority. At the same time, 
the HCC is more separated from the ordinary judiciary than the German Federal 
Constitutional Court. The latter may review any governmental action, including judicial 
decision, administrative decree and legislative act in a constitutional complaint proceeding.1 
The former may only review those individual complaints that state the judicial application 
of an unconstitutional law in the course of the proceeding. Thus, in Hungary, in a concrete 
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is a revised version of a part of the author’s recent book, see Tóth, G. A.: Túl a szövegen. Értekezés a 
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1 Kommers, D. P.: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
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controversy ending in a judicial decision, only the law applied can be reviewed, not the 
decision itself. If the HCC concludes that an unconstitutional law has been applied then the 
procedure may be re-opened. If only the application of the law was unconstitutional in the 
concrete case then the HCC is powerless. Consequently, Hungarian constitutional review is 
incomplete. There is no legal remedy in cases where fundamental rights are violated as a 
result of judicial application and interpretation of the law.2
The deﬁ ciency of constitutional complaint is not counterbalanced by the abstract nature 
of constitutional review. Anyone is entitled to bring an action without limitation; there are 
no deadlines to be observed, nor is the applicant required to show any impact or other 
legally protected interest (actio popularis).3 The adverse effect of this procedure is that it 
seems as if Constitutional Court judges appear to be confronting norms with norms. If the 
lower norm (statute or other law) contradicts the higher norm (the Constitution), the HCC 
annuls the former. It is up to the discretion of the judges to what extent they present the 
encroachments of rights and social problems in the course of any constitutional review that 
is separated from concrete controversies.4
But can judges hide behind the articles of law? Law is not exhausted by any catalogue 
of rules and principles, but an interpretive concept inﬂ uencing the everyday life of the 
members of the political community.5 Law and, especially, constitutional law is a practice 
of the political community in which the HCC is merely a co-actor, not the only one. Legal 
authorities vested with interpretive authority (the President of the Republic, ordinary courts, 
ombudsmen etc.), the petitioners and other legal subjects’ not authoritative legal inter-
pretation also form a part of the constitutional interpretation practice.
Thus, the interpreters of the Constitution are participants in a communal practice. The 
way they examine the text of the Constitution is not independent from space and time, but 
they possess culturally and historically predetermined pieces of knowledge and premises 
(“pre-judice”).6 In the course of deciding cases these preconceptions enter into dialogue 
with the text of the norms. We can say that interpretation is embedded in the everyday life 
of the political community. On the one hand, it is so because the social environment provides 
the preconditions of interpretation. On the other hand, interpretation shapes the communal 
practice. Therefore, the appropriateness of constitutional interpretation depends whether it 
is in accord with the facts of the political community. And it also depends on what practical 
2 Hence, Georg Brunner’s conclusion is well founded: ‘The arrangement for a constitutional 
complaint constitutes the most unsuccessful provision of the Constitutional Court Act.’ Brunner, G.: 
Structure and Proceedings of the Hungarian Constitutional Judiciary. In: Sólyom, L.−Brunner, G.: 
Constitutional Judiciary in a New Democracy: the Hungarian Constitutional Court. Michigan, 
2000, 84.
3 Ibid. 81.
4 The names of the petitioners and the content of the petitions are exceptionally made known to 
the public. In 2009 the European Court of Human Rights held that there had been a violation of 
Article 10 of the Convention (freedom of expression and freedom of information), because the 
Constitutional Court had denied the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union the right to release an MP’s 
petition for abstract review. The MP’s petition requested the constitutional review of some recent 
amendments to the Criminal Code which concerned certain drug-related offenses. See Társaság a 
Szabadságjogokért versus Hungary, App. no. 37374/05., Judgment of 14 April 2009.
5 Here I follow Dworkin’s conception of law as integrity. See Dworkin, R.: Law’s Empire. 
Oxford, 1998, 226, 410–413.
6 Here I refer to Gadamer’s hermeneutic conception. See Gadamer, Hans-G.: Truth and Method. 
New York, 1975.
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consequences the interpretation have, i.e. how it forms the relations of the political 
community. 
In this analysis I show that experiences drawn from social reality inevitably emerge in 
the course of the abstract interpretation of the Constitution. The words of Constitution are 
inseparable from those societal phenomena to which the words refer. Symbolically speaking, 
the understanding of constitutional rules does not take place in an interpretation laboratory 
of a scientiﬁ c institute, but departs from communal practice and in the end contributes to 
the formation of that communal practice. 
I show through the example of two groups how the social environment and 
constitutional interpretation interacts. One of them is the societal and constitutional 
perception of various religious groups; the other is that of the Roma as an ethnic minority 
group. My thesis is that the Hungarian constitutional jurisprudence treats these two social 
categories differently. It refers to historical and cultural facts in order to safeguard the 
privileges of churches, especially, historical churches. However, the social problems of 
Roma that also have historical and cultural roots are disregarded. This double standard in 
the twenty-year Hungarian practice has resulted in providing preferential treatment for 
historical churches. Conversely, the HCC’s jurisprudence does not react to racial 
discrimination against Roma people.
Constitutional Principles 
The Hungarian Constitution lays down the fundamental tenets relating to churches, ethnic 
minorities and the principles of equality in general. Since the text comes from 1989 and its 
models were international human rights instruments and the more recent Western 
constitutions, it was written in the language of modern constitutionalism.
The Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution reads: ‘In the Republic of Hungary 
everybody has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.’ (Article 60 para. 
1.) According to the Separation Principle of the Constitution: ‘the church shall operate in 
separation from the state’. (Article 60 para. 3.)
The Constitution forbids discrimination based upon speciﬁ c traits. ‘The Republic of 
Hungary shall ensure the human rights and civil rights for all persons on its territory without 
any kind of discrimination, such as on the basis of race, color, gender, language, religion, 
political and other opinion, national or social origins, ﬁ nancial situation, birth or on any 
other grounds whatsoever.’ (Article 70/A para 1.) Besides the antidiscrimination principle, 
the Constitution also provides for the principle of preferential treatment: ‘The Republic of 
Hungary shall promote equality of rights for everyone through measures aimed at eliminating 
the inequality of opportunity.’ (Article 70/A para 3.) Moreover, the Constitution explicitly 
protects minorities: ‘The national and ethnic minorities living in the Republic of Hungary 
participate in the sovereign power of the people’ and ‘The Republic of Hungary shall 
provide for the protection of national and ethnic minorities.’ (Article 68 paras 1 and 3.)
So, according to the written text of the Constitution, the state is separated from the 
church; national and ethnic minorities enjoy special protection and it is forbidden to 
discriminate on the basis of suspect classiﬁ cation such as religion, race, color and ethnic 
origin. Since the Constitution was written in the language of abstract principles it does not 
refer explicitly to individual churches7 or minorities, among them the most populous, the 
Roma.
7 Moreover the text of the Constitution refers to ’the church’ as if there were only one.
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The HCC in its ﬁ rst landmark decisions established that liberty rights, including the 
right to free exercise of religion and equality emanate from the notion of human dignity. In 
1993 the HCC clariﬁ ed all the relevant notions concerning personal freedom of religion.8 
‘The individual freedom of conscience and religion acknowledges that the person’s 
conviction, and, within this, in a given case, religion, is a part of human dignity, so their 
freedom is a pre-condition for the free development of personality.’9
The requirement of the separation of state and churches and of religious neutrality of 
the state was also declared in that decision. ‘From the principle of separation it follows that 
the state must not be institutionally attached to churches or any one church; that the state 
must not identify itself with the teachings of any church; and that the state must not interfere 
with the internal working of any church, and especially must not take a stance in matters of 
religious truths. From this (as well as from Article 70/A of the Constitution) it follows that 
the state must treat churches equally.’10
The general principle of equality also reﬂ ects the idea of human dignity. ‘The 
prohibition of discrimination means all people must be treated as equal (as persons with 
equal dignity) by law – i.e. the fundamental right to human dignity may not be impaired, 
and the criteria for the distribution of the entitlements and beneﬁ ts shall be determined with 
the same respect and prudence, and with the same degree of consideration of individual 
interests.’11 
The HCC connected the requirement of preferential treatment, the so-called ‘positive 
discrimination’ to this principle. ‘The right to equal personal dignity may occasionally result 
in entitlements according to which goods and opportunities must be distributed (even 
qualitatively) equally to everyone. If, however, a social purpose (…) may only be achieved 
if equality in the narrower sense cannot be realized, then such a positive discrimination 
shall not be declared unconstitutional. The limitation upon positive discrimination is either 
the prohibition of discrimination in its broader meaning, i.e. concerning equal dignity, or the 
protection of the fundamental rights which are positively expressed in the Constitution.’12
With a bit of exaggeration we could say that the HCC reads the Hungarian 
Constitution with the help of the theories of Rawls and Dworkin. The principles of justice 
are echoed in giving priority to each person’s equal right to basic liberties, including 
liberty of conscience compatible with the similar liberty of others. The relationship 
between basic liberties and equality of opportunity has been also read through the lens of 
Rawls.13 In addition, the HCC’s concept concerning the neutrality of the state originates 
from the notion of equal liberty of conscience.14 Similarly, the Hungarian constitutional 
    8 Decision 4/1993. (II. 12.), ABH 1993, 48. The original versions of the decisions are available 
at http://www.mkab.hu/hu/frisshat.htm. Some important decisions are in English at http://www.mkab.
hu/en/enpage3.htm.
    9 Decision 4/1993. (II. 12.), ABH 1993, 48, 52.
10 Decision 4/1993. (II. 12.), ABH 1993, 48, 52.
11 Decision 9/1990. (IV. 25.), ABH 1990, 46, 48.
12 Decision 9/1990. (IV. 25.), ABH 1990, 48–49. 
13 Rawls, J.: A Theory of Justice. Cambridge (Mass.), 1971, 60–61.
14 Ibid. 205–211.
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concept of equal human dignity and the treatment as an equal are derived from the 
Dworkinian egalitarian point of view.15
Below I brieﬂ y show how the HCC applies these abstract constitutional principles in 
cases affecting religious groups and Roma people. 
Historical Privileges
In the above-mentioned landmark freedom of religion decision, the petitioners simply 
challenged the constitutionality of an act that provided for returning real estates to certain 
churches that had been their owners before the communist nationalization. 
Besides the neutrality principle, the HCC also emphasized that a number of tasks 
formerly carried out by the churches (e.g. school education, taking care of the sick, or 
charity) have become the duties of the state while the churches have also maintained their 
activity in these domains. This is why ‘from the separation principle it does not follow that 
the state should endorse the negative right to freedom of religion, let alone religious 
indifference. Nor does the separation of church and state mean that the state must disregard 
the special characteristics of religion and church in its legislation.’ And, also, ‘treating the 
churches equally does not exclude taking the actual social roles of the individual churches 
into account.’16
Hence, according to the interpretation of the HCC, on the one hand formal equality 
followed from fundamental principles of the Constitution; on the other hand it became 
possible to treat those churches preferably that had been operating for a long period of time. 
In the concrete case this resulted in the fact that within the scheme of reprivatization only 
historical churches were returned their church-related real estates in the course of property 
compensation. Other institutions were given only partial compensation for their nationalized 
real estates.
Based upon this precedent the HCC handed down two important decisions in 1993 that 
pointed in different directions. In one of the decisions the HCC dealt with the conﬂ ict 
between legal rules mirroring religious obligations and alternative social customs. The 
leaders of the Jewish religious community complained that under the Labor Code one could 
not work on Sunday in exchange for a different day off. The petitioners requested that 
Saturday should also count as a work free day. They also considered it discriminatory that 
only Christian holidays (Easter and Christmas) were recognized by the state as non-working 
days.17
Although the decision anachronistically distinguishes between countries within the 
‘Jewish-Christian tradition’ and ‘Islamic countries’, the reasoning was not centered on 
religious grounds. First, the HCC declared that the State ‘may not favor any of the religions 
in an exceptionally exclusive treatment’ and ‘may not hinder any [...] members of religion 
in their free exercise of their faith’. Second, the HCC based its decision on the assumption 
that the greatest holidays of the Christian religions have a secularized and general social 
character. They are ‘red-letter’ days not because of their religious content but because of 
15 Dworkin, R.: Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge (Mass.), 1977, 227. László Sólyom, the 
ﬁ rst president of the HCC acknowledged that Dworkin’s conception was imported. Sólyom, L.: The 
Hungarian Constitutional Court and the Social Change. Yale Journal of International Law, 19 (1994) 
1, 222, 229.
16 Decision 4/1993. (II. 12.), ABH 1993, 48, 53.
17 Decision 10/1993. (II. 27.), ABH 1993, 105.
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economic considerations and compliance with the expectations of society. ‘The religious 
and secular elements are strongly mixed in these holidays. (…) Most of the citizens like to 
spend these days–without identifying themselves with their religious content–with their 
families, following tradition or with resting. No similar societal traditions are attached to 
the two biggest Jewish feasts (Ros Hasana and Yom Kippur). In the course of determining 
holidays as non-working days the legislator was led by traditions and expectations and not 
by securing preferential treatment for one of the churches.’18 Based on these considerations, 
the HCC upheld the validity of the law. Declaring Easter Monday, Christmas Day and 
Sunday non-working days were declared constitutional.19
So this decision did not provide preferential treatment to religions and churches. The 
constitutional reasoning was tailored to profane traditions, popular customs and to the 
majority conception of holidays that form the communal practice. Thus, here customs 
appear in a weak sense. The traditional regulation can be upheld since no evidence appeared 
that would point towards changing the practice. A legislative and social practice that has 
religious origins but can be justiﬁ ed on a secular ground does not violate the principle of 
equal dignity.20
The decision on the statutory preconditions of founding churches pointed in a different 
direction. A petitioner challenged the statute that required a church to have at least one 
hundred members in order to be registered with and recognized by the state as discriminatory. 
The HCC, in rejecting the claim, emphasized that this objective distinction had no inﬂ uence 
on the most important functions of the religious communities – worship, education, and 
social services. According to the decision, communal exercise of religion can be carried out 
without church status. Moreover, the HCC’s reasoning distinguished not only between 
churches and religious organizations without church status, but also among churches 
themselves. ‘It is not a constitutional problem that historical churches with large membership 
through their organization and their co-operation with the State in many areas facilitate the 
exercise of religion for their members where the assistance of other (often state) institutions 
is required, such as in health-care or penitentiaries.’21
There is a fundamental difference between the two cases’ practical perspective. 
Speciﬁ cally, the judgment on Saturday and holiday work avoided discriminating between 
religions, since it attributes secular reason for the law. At the same time, the judgment on 
church status explicitly and purposively provided preferential treatment for historical 
churches vis-à-vis other churches, religious groups and communities.22
18 Decision 10/1993. (II. 27.), ABH 1993, 105, 106–107.
19 For more on the early freedom of religion case-law in Hungary see Paczolay, P.: The Role of 
Religion in Reconstructing Politics in Hungary. Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative 
Law, 4 (1996) 2, 261. Paczolay argues that the HCC tried to hold a central position between 
conservative and liberal attacks.
20 Contrary to this, tradition in the strong sense means that tradition is an unconditionally 
obligatory norm. This type of traditionalism supports maintaining the tradition even if it violates the 
principles of equality. 
21 Decision 8/1993. (II. 27.), ABH 1993, 99, 100.
22 András Sajó raises the question why the need arises from time to time from the state’s side to 
act against small churches. He argues that the modern Hungarian Constitution provides for the 
separation of the state and church, however, this decision treats other countries’ (e.g. Austria, 
Germany) century-old compromises as models. Sajó, A.: A „kisegyház” mint alkotmányjogi 
képtelenség (“The Small church” as Constitutional Nonsense). Fundamentum (1999) 2, 87, 96.
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This latter decision became the precedent in the Hungarian case-law. In 1995 the HCC 
examined the constitutionality of the governmental decree concerning army chaplain 
service. The decree provides for the free exercise of religion and spiritual care only for 
members of the four ‘historical churches’ (Catholic, Calvinist, Lutheran, Jewish). The army 
chaplain service is operated with the participation of only these churches upon the 
governmental agreement concluded with them. The HCC came to the conclusion that the 
privileges of historical churches in the governmental decree are not unconstitutional, but 
‘refer to the real historical role and social signiﬁ cance of such churches.’ Proving their real 
social signiﬁ cance, the decision’s reasoning applied statistical argument. A survey conducted 
in the Armed Forces showed that only ‘the believers of the four churches could be measured 
at a percental rate’. (The statistics did not show the degree of exercise of religion, but only 
the formal afﬁ liation with churches.) Besides the data, the HCC tried to give other reasons 
in order justify unequal treatment among churches. According to the reasoning, believers of 
other religions may individually exercise their faith in the Army; moreover, if the law in 
question were changed, other churches could be included in the army chaplain service. 
I think with such reasoning one could justify the establishment of a state-church.23
There was no empirical examination conducted in other cases relating to the signiﬁ cant 
social role of historical churches. It was sufﬁ cient to refer to the 1993 and 1995 precedents 
in order to justify and extend privileges. Thus, numerous cases shutting up the communist 
past and laying the foundations for the future ended with an exceptionally (mostly from a 
ﬁ nancial perspective) favorable outcome for historic churches. As I have already mentioned, 
within the scheme of reprivatization only historical churches were returned their church-
related real estates in the course of property compensation. Following this, the HCC 
declared it constitutional that churches are exempted from the general statutory ban on 
acquiring soil.24 The HCC upheld that obligatory lustration extends, besides state leaders 
and professional politicians, to persons who carry out ‘public opinion forming tasks’. 
However, contrary to journalists, for example, a decision exempted church leaders from 
lustration.25 Practicing clergymen did not have to serve mandatory military service because 
this so-called ‘positive discrimination’ ensured the believers’ free exercise of religion.26 
Since 1997, in order to fulﬁ ll their role emanating from the free exercise of religion, 
‘positive discrimination’ has to be secured for church-run schools and kindergartens as 
compared with public education institutions run by foundations or associations. According 
to the decision, only church-run schools have the right to the auxiliary subsidy above the 
normative state allowance.27 In 2007 this preferential ﬁ nancial treatment extended to the 
social, child-protective and welfare activities of the churches in contrast with those humanist 
23 Decision 970/B/1994, ABH 1995, 739, 743. Many criticized this decision. According to János 
Kis, this judgment would hardly survive the test either of the separation principle or that of the 
religious neutrality of the state and of the abolition of religious discrimination. Kis, J.: Constitutional 
Democracy. Central European University Press, 2003, 282.
24 Decision 4/1993. (II. 12.), ABH 1993, 48, 63, 68. Decision 35/1994. (VI. 24.), ABH 1994, 
197, 204.
25 Decision 31/2003. (VI. 4.), ABH 2003, 352, 367. This decision overruled a former one that 
stated: certain organization of churches and their representatives ‘surely take part in forming the 
public opinion’. Decision 60/1994. (XII. 24.), ABH 1994, 342, 358. 
26 Decision 46/1994. (X. 21.), ABH 1994, 260, 272. Mandatory military service ceased to exist 
in 2005 by constitutional amendment.
27 Decision 22/1997. (IV. 25.), ABH 1997, 107, 116. 
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institutions that are not afﬁ liated with churches.28 As a result, for example, church-run 
schools receive more extended state subsidies than not-for-proﬁ t schools operated by the 
Waldorf Foundation. In 2008 the judges, by referring to the Concordat concluded between 
the Republic of Hungary and the Vatican, demanded that Catholic schools and public 
education institutions run by the state or municipalities be ﬁ nanced to exactly the same 
degree.29
This inventory shows how far the principle of state neutrality as it appears in the text 
of the Constitution got in cases interpreting the role of churches. As a matter of fact, we can 
see an argumentative procedure that shares a common starting- and ending point: the 
practice of the political community. From the perspective of constitutional interpretation the 
judges accepted the premise that historical churches have notable social weight, and that 
they have an outstanding role in the ﬁ eld of spiritual care and, also socially and culturally. 
At the same time, with their decisions they inﬂ uenced the communal practice in a way that 
churches, and especially historical churches, were granted exceptionally favorable conditions 
for their spiritual and other activities. 
The principles of the Constitution demand the separation of church and state and the 
equal treatment of religious communities. At the same time, the interpretative practice 
strengthened the old privileges of historical churches. According to the above reasoning 
these favors do not violate the principle of equal dignity and equal treatment. Moreover, the 
exceptional treatment of practicing clergymen and ﬁ nancing church-run public education 
institutions falls within the ambit of constitutionally justiﬁ able preferential treatment.30
The Hidden Roma Reality
Now I turn from the category of religious groups to the Roma as an ethnic group. It is well 
known that in Hungary many hundred thousands of Roma live who have to face social 
difﬁ culties, prejudice and segregation.31 Similarly to the historic and social role of churches, 
this could not be seen in the text of the Constitution. However, if one wants to be informed 
by the constitutional case-law, it is easy to overlook the fact that a part of the citizens is 
Roma. This is so since the HCC has not openly addressed the problems affecting Roma. 
From the ﬁ rst decade of constitutional review it can be reconstructed from one of the 
decisions regarding compensation that, during the Second World War, similarly to Jews, 
Roma were also deported.32 Apart from this there are two procedural orders that can be 
found in the case-law. 
In one of the cases the petitioner argued that in the course of employment she found 
herself in an unfavorable situation due to the fact that her name refers to her mother’s Roma 
origin. The President of the HCC dismissed her petition on procedural grounds since she 
did not question a speciﬁ c legal rule, but only the application of a legal provision in a 
28 Decision 225/B/2000, ABH 2007, 1241.
29 Decision 99/2008. (VII. 3.), ABH 2008, 844.
30 Kriszta Kovács argues that the HCC uses the concept of preferential treatment in the wrong 
way and for the wrong purpose. Kovács, K.: Think Positive, Preferential Treatment in Hungary. 
Fundamentum (2008) 5, 46.
31 See, for example, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance’s latest report on 
Hungary. http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/Country-by-Country/Hungary/HUN-CbC-IV-
2009-003-ENG.pdf
32 Decision 1/1995. (II. 8.), ABH 1995, 31, 35.
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concrete case. According to the procedural order that dismissed the claim, the law on 
changing the names ‘has no relevant constitutional relationship with the right to work non-
discrimination clauses’ of the Constitution.33 Thus, the discriminative nature behind the 
facially neutral and generally applicable law could not be unveiled. 
In the other case, a non-governmental organization protecting minorities, the Otherness 
Foundation challenged a local government resolution. Its ﬁ rst point provided: the local 
representative body ‘with respect to the future decides that it declares those people persona 
non grata who do not ﬁ t in the life of the community, violating and endangering the public 
security and in the future, with all legal instruments it will make every effort to make these 
persons to leave the town.’ The second point of the contested resolution empowered the 
notary to examine whether ‘there are legal means to prevent’ people who behave as outlined 
earlier ‘from moving into the town’. The third point was a similar request also addressed to 
the notary. According to the HCC, the last two points of the resolution were not normative 
but individual decisions that ‘did not refer to an unconstitutional procedure’ and thus the 
judges had no competence to review them. As to the ﬁ rst point of the local governmental 
resolution, the judges concluded that it had neither individual, nor normative nature: ‘it 
expresses intent’ and ‘general will’ to solve local social problems and it counts as ‘the 
autonomous and democratic administration of local public affairs’.34 This decision is similar 
to the former in declining to decide on the merit of the case based on the fact that challenged 
provisions do not function as norms. At the same time, the HCC’s decision indirectly 
legitimizes local governmental aspirations with hidden or indirect racism. 
In the second decade of constitutional review the number of petitions relating to the 
discrimination of Roma has risen. At the beginning of the year 2000, two decisions were 
rendered in signiﬁ cant cases. Mainly non-governmental organizations protecting the human 
rights of Roma objected that laws did not provide adequate guaranties and did not secure 
proper procedures ‘to cope with discrimination in the Hungarian society and in state 
institutions.’ At that time Hungarian statute law did not demand equal treatment from 
private organizations acting in the public sphere. There was no efﬁ cient legal protection 
against indirect discrimination, and the conditions for proving discrimination were very 
difﬁ cult to meet. It was therefore almost hopeless to act against racial discrimination in the 
everyday life.
The decision of the HCC gives a long list of enacted laws against discrimination and 
concludes that it is not unconstitutional that ‘there is no a comprehensive Act dealing with 
antidiscrimination issues’. Although ‘it is conceivable that the fragmented legislation does 
not provide for certain types of discrimination’, the judges had failed to examine these 
cases.35 Thus the Parliament ﬁ nally acknowledged Hungary’s obligations concerning the 
approximation of Hungarian to European law and passed the Act on Equal Treatment and 
Promotion of Equal Opportunities.
The other case was the overture of the housing decisions. The Parliamentary 
Ombudsmen for Civil Rights and for the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities jointly 
initiated a constitutional interpretation regarding to social problems. To put it simply, as a 
result of an inadequate institutional system, the homeless freeze to death on the streets of 
big cities in winter; the so-called ‘arbitrary squatters’ who are Roma families are moved out 
33 Order 924/I/1996, ABH 1997, 973. 
34 Order 949/B/1997, ABH 1998, 1265.
35 Decision 45/2000. (XII. 8.), ABH 2000, 344, 347.
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by municipalities so that they become hopelessly homeless.36 According to the judges of the 
HCC, concrete rights, among them, the right to housing, cannot be derived from Article 
70/E of the Constitution that provides for the right to social security. However, the state, in 
order to protect human life and dignity, ‘is obliged to take care of the fundamental conditions 
of human existence–in the case of homelessness the state is liable to provide for housing if 
the situation directly endangers human life’.37 Notwithstanding the petitions, the judges did 
not deal with the conﬂ ict between local governments and arbitrary squatters, who are mainly 
Roma. 
Almost at the same time Parliament declared arbitrary squatting a misdemeanor and 
facilitated the vacation of arbitrarily squatted ﬂ ats. The statutory amendments triggered 
many constitutional petitions, in which non-governmental organizations formulated the 
view that the new situation ‘raises the danger of discrimination on ethnic grounds’. The 
decision of the HCC replied to this argument by pointing out that ‘the situation of all 
arbitrary squatters is considered equally, independently of his or her ethnic origin’. By 
referring to their earlier decision, the judges declared: ‘the state is obliged to secure the 
housing of evicted arbitrary squatters if their lives are directly endangered’.38 The judges, 
however, refrained from examining the actual situation of Roma. So, based on this reasoning, 
one could not tell us whether squatting problems are caused by alternative squatters known 
from Western metropolitan environments or whether they can be attributed to the fact that, 
similarly to South American favela, the number of slums in the country has increased. 
The Act and the assenting HCC decision encouraged many local governments. Local 
government decrees proliferated according to which those who had been formerly arbitrary, 
mala ﬁ de or squatters without legal title could not participate in the bid for social rental 
ﬂ ats. Here it is important to note that according to former judicial precedents such local 
governmental decrees were unconstitutional on formal grounds since they contradicted the 
Act on Flat Rentals. For example, one of the Metropolitan’s local governmental (Óbuda-
Békásmegyer) decrees was annulled for this reason in 2005.39 
Nevertheless, there was a radical shift in newer cases. By examining the rules of two 
big towns, Miskolc and Debrecen, the judges concluded that due to the amendment of 
statutory regulation the local governments may enact such decrees. That is to say, they may 
exclude arbitrary squatters and squatters without legal title from competition for social 
rental ﬂ ats.40 At the same time, two important dissenting opinions were handed down. 
According to one of dissenting opinions, the regulation is discriminative since ‘it excludes 
those people from taking part in the competition (mainly unemployed, unskilled people 
with their large families) who due to their ﬁ nancial and social situation are coerced to 
commit unlawful acts and who would otherwise mainly resort to social rental ﬂ ats’.41 The 
other HCC judge also underlined that the only reason for exclusion is a misdemeanor 
motivated by hardship, while other unlawful acts (e.g. failure to pay local taxes) and even 
committing grave crimes do not pose an obstacle to bidding for social rental ﬂ ats.42 I think 
36 Of course, there are Roma among the homeless and not all squatters are Roma.
37 Decision 42/2000. (XI. 8.), ABH 2000, 329.
38 Decision 71/2002. (XII. 17.), ABH 2002, 425, 431.
39 In this case the petitioner also argued that that regulation discriminates against the Roma 
population. Decision 4/2005. (II. 25.), ABH 2005, 613.
40 Decision 1074/B/2004, ABH 2006, 1669. Decision 1075/B/2004, ABH 2006, 1686.
41 Judge Bihari’s dissenting opinion, Decision 1074/B/2004, ABH 2006, 1669, 1681.
42 Judge Bragyova’s dissenting opinion, Decision 1074/B/2004, ABH 2006, 1669, 1683.
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these two dissenting opinions came closest to the core of the problem, but the taboo was not 
broken. For two decades the problems relating to the exclusion and discrimination of Roma 
has remained hidden.43
Playing with Time
I hope in the former two chapters I have managed to prove the role the facts of the political 
community play. The reasoning is supported by historical references and empirical data 
when a conclusion preferring traditional churches is required. In Roma cases, however, the 
reasoning of the judgments does not reﬂ ect social reality. At the same time, we can see that 
discriminative practice behind the norms can be demonstrated. In order to ultimately support 
this thesis let me recall two cases that, due to their temporal coincidence, make it possible 
to compare the preferences of the judges. One of them is the constitutional review of the 
Act on Registered Partnership. The other is related to local government decrees regulating 
the social allowances of Roma living in deep poverty. 
In the last days of 2007 the Hungarian Parliament enacted the Act on Registered 
Partnership. The HCC formerly on many occasions declared homosexual marriage to be 
contrary to the Constitution. ‘The Constitutional Court points out that both in our culture 
and law the institution of marriage is traditionally a union of a man and a woman. This 
union typically is aimed at giving birth to common children and bringing them up in the 
family, in addition to being the framework for the mutual taking of care and assistance of 
the partners. (…) The institution of marriage is constitutionally protected by the state also 
with respect to the fact that it promotes the establishment of families with common 
children.’44
This conventionalist interpretation followed the conception of historical churches, 
namely, the text of the Constitution only provides that ‘[t]he Republic of Hungary shall 
protect the institutions of marriage and the family’. (Article 15.) Thus, the majority of the 
legislative branch took only very cautious steps towards the equal status of homosexuals. 
According to the new statute, property and personal rights were attached to registration, but 
there was no possibility to use the other’s name nor for adoption. Besides this, the new 
rules also enabled heterosexuals to establish registered partnership status. In this way 
legislators aimed to create the legal framework for partnerships outside of marriage. In this 
manner they also tried to decrease the legal segregation of homosexuals. 
At the time of passing the Act on Registered Partnership, an anti-Roma local 
governmental movement was initiated. The essence of the Monok-model (named after the 
ﬁ rst municipality to introduce such measures) is that those receiving social allowances were 
obliged by local governmental decree to carry out public-interest work, or allowances were 
43 Reproductive rights-related issues, including the decision on sterilization, are noteworthy. 
The reasoning of the decision is very abstract: ‘cases in several European countries and the United 
States also prove that despite of the regulation based on voluntariness and non-discrimination, 
numerous abuses may occur in practice’. Decision 43/2005. (XI. 14.), ABH 2005, 535, 540. In reality, 
similarly to the Slovak and Czech cases, Hungarian Roma women are among the victims. For example, 
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Woman held that the State had violated 
a Hungarian Roma woman’s fundamental rights by performing the sterilization surgery without 
 obtaining her informed consent. (CEDAW/C/36/D/4/2004.) See also Body and Soul: Forced Sterili-
zation and Other Assaults on Roma Reproductive Freedom in Slovakia. Center for Reproductive 
Rights, 2003.
44 Decision 14/1995. (III. 13.), ABH 1995, 82, 83.
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directly revoked from those who were entitled to them. Via these regulations local 
governments who aimed to displace members of the Roma minority were even willing to 
violate the Social Act and the Act on Child Protection. In this way, the increasing ill will 
connected to the economic and political crisis was aimed at the most defenseless minority. 
They did not receive a proper job and pay–only an allowance. The fact that they performed 
work publicly (e.g. collecting garbage) did not improve their situation on the labor market; 
it rather increased prejudices towards them.
Subsequently the Parliament passed the Act establishing the equal status of 
homosexuals, having considered the changing habits of young heterosexual couples. At the 
same time, many local governments passed decrees so as to deprive Roma of the material 
resources of the community and to displace them from settlements. Both legal changes 
stimulated serious debates and challenged before the HCC. The Act on Registered 
Partnership was primarily objected by historical churches in the public sphere and 
immediately several petitions were sent to the HCC. The decrees on the allowances were 
questioned at the HCC by the Roma Civil Rights Foundation and a Head of Public 
Administration Ofﬁ ce (that supervise the legality of local government decrees). In the 
former case the regulation to be contrasted with the Constitution has not been declared 
unconstitutional in any comparable countries. The latter case included norms that were 
passed explicitly and knowingly with the intention of constitutional violation by local 
governments. 
Now the question is when the HCC rendered decisions and what the court said. The 
judgment on the Act on Registered Partnerships was passed before the given statute had 
come into force. The decision declared the whole regulation unconstitutional, and thus it 
did not come into effect.45 The statute promoting equality was found to be unconstitutional 
due to the conventional conception of marriage.46 In terms of heterosexuals the judges did 
not accept that the statute does not separate adequately the status of registered partnership 
from the institution of marriage. Adoption, the right to use the other’s name, the waiting 
period before registration and other differences were proved to be unsatisfactory in 
protecting the so-called ‘essential content’ of marriage.47
45 Decision 154/2008. (XII. 17.), ABH 2008, 1203.
46 The decision refers to the judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court several times. 
BVerfG, 1 BvF 1/01, 1 BvF 2/01 vom 17.7.2002. However, the HCC’s reasoning is rather similar to 
the rejected objections of the German petitioners. The German petitioners also tried to prevent the act 
from coming into force, but the decision was published only after the act had become effective. 
According to the German petitioners, the act empties the institution of marriage. Contrary to this, the 
rules formulated in the ratio decidendi of the decision provide that the constitutional protection of 
marriage ‘does not hinder the legislator in establishing such rights and obligations for the partnership 
of homosexuals as are identical or very similar to it’. According to the reasoning, ‘the conception of 
the special protection of marriage which points to the apprehension of such partnerships in their 
difference to marriage and vesting less rights in them cannot be justiﬁ ed’. (Para 98.) Consequently, 
the German decision did not provide for the discrimination of registered partners, but approved the act 
that aimed at equaling the status of homosexuals. 
47 Apart from Hungary, no other state has sought to exclude heterosexuals on constitutional 
grounds from living in a registered partnership that is more or less similar to marriage. In some places 
there is a possibility for the registered cohabitation of heterosexuals (e.g. Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxemburg, France, New Zealand, Québec in Canada, Catalonia in Spain etc.). In those countries in 
which this option is only open to homosexuals besides marriage or as an alternative to it, it is not for 
constitutional reasons that cohabitation of heterosexuals remains unregistered (e.g. in common law). 
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As to homosexual couples the judgment implicitly established the category of separate 
and unequal. Even though the decision theoretically acknowledged that the registered 
partnership of homosexuals is not unconstitutional, it did not approve the reviewed 
regulation.48 Apart from the fact that homosexual couples may not get married, when it 
comes to regulating their registered partnership ‘the differences ﬂ owing from the nature’ of 
such relationships and marriage must be maintained. This means that in the Hungarian 
constitutional practice the reasons for equal treatment must be shown, not that there is a 
compelling interest in unequal treatment.49 
In the meantime, no decision declaring unconstitutionality has been rendered in the 
local government cases that further dampened the prospects of Roma.50 Procrastination 
resulted in the fact that rather than the unconstitutional local government decrees being 
modiﬁ ed according to the statutes, Parliament had begun to modify the statutes at the 
expense of people living in deep poverty.51 I think it can be inferred from these two cases 
that choosing the time of interpretation and decision-making also shows the preferences of 
a court.
Conclusions
The Constitution consists of abstract principles. It separates the state from churches (that 
have equal status) and it protects ethnic minorities. The judges interpret the abstract norms 
of the Constitution and laws. However, the words of the Constitution refer to a concrete 
political community. Adjudication is a form of decision-making on common, public issues. 
Therefore, constitutional review is closely connected to the practices of the political 
community. 
This is proven by Hungarian case-law relating to historical churches and Roma. The 
presented cases serve as an example that constitutional law is an interpretative concept. 
Authoritative constitutional interpretation is triggered by the interpretative initiatives of 
citizens, not-for-proﬁ t organizations, ombudsmen etc. The decisions of the HCC inﬂ uence 
the operation of the legislation and other institutions and, accordingly, form the practices of 
the political community.
48 After the HCC’s ruling, the Parliament passed an altered version of the Act on Registered 
Partnership. As a result registered same sex partnership has become a legal option in Hungary.
49 The ECtHR protects homosexual relationships according to Article 8 of the Convention. The 
state has to prove that the statutory regulation adversely affecting homosexual partners compared with 
heterosexuals serves a legitimate aim and is justiﬁ able. For example Karner v. Austria, App. no. 
40016/08., Judgment of 24 July 2003. The family concept of the Convention does not only protect 
relationships based on marriages; thus the state may not regulate what type of relationship couples 
adopting a child choose. Emonet and Others v. Switzerland, App. no. 39051/03., Judgment of 13 
December 2007. 
50 The HCC annulled two local government decrees in the summer of 2009. Both of them made 
it possible to revoke child-protection allowances if the child does not go to school. Decision 79/2009. 
(VII. 10.); Decision 80/2009. (VII. 10.). The reason of annulment was that the decrees were contrary 
to statutory regulation. There was no reference to the Roma minority in the decisions. 
51 Parliament supported the government’s ‘Road to Work’ program that tried to take the wind 
out of the sails of racist local governmental aspirations. However, by this time many local governments 
had moved ahead and introduced a so-called ‘social card’ that limited the utilization of ﬁ nancial 
allowances.
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The choices of the interpreters determine to what extent social reality appears in 
judgments and to what conclusions it contributes. In the case of army chaplain service we 
can ﬁ nd the example that judges were oriented in social facts with the help of statistics. The 
constitutional privileges of historical churches were based on their conventional social role. 
When changing societal experiences were confronted with the conventions, like the 
frequency of going to church, the habits of getting married and family relations then the 
conventions were held to be stronger than reality. 
In the practice of other institutions, empirical surveys are an effective method of 
mapping indirect discrimination and racism.52 The Hungarian jurisprudence did not resort 
to such tools, however. Thus, while historical churches became constitutional categories, 
Roma do not even appear in the decisions.
The different approach to churches and Roma can be traced back to a mistaken 
conception of equality. The concept “eliminating the inequality of opportunity” in Article 
70/A para. 3 of the Constitution explicitly refers to social situations. The text cannot be 
interpreted without their evaluative analysis. The HCC described the preferential treatment 
of historical churches as positive discrimination without shedding light on their adverse 
situation. At the same time, in Roma cases the features of indirect discrimination and 
preferential treatment were not put forward.
There is a signiﬁ cant distance between the principles and the case-law.53 The reason is 
that there is a lack of adequate reﬂ ection on social reality. In the case of historical churches 
the judges apply the concept of preferential treatment, but it is not clear what type of 
inequality can be found at the starting point. In contrast, in the case of Roma all empirical 
analysis forewarns of the extraordinary social consequences arising from inequality. In 
relation to Roma, there is evidently a need for special legislation, since the root of the 
problems and the nature of hardship is different from other ethnic minorities. Moreover, the 
situation is becoming more serious. Verbal and physical assaults against Roma are increasing 
and certain public ﬁ gures use anti-Roma speech. In line with these trends, indirect 
discrimination has not decreased, but rather increased in laws and in deciding individual 
cases. The Hungarian constitutional institutions not only remain color-blind, but simply 
blind and mute.54
52 For example in Strasbourg in relation to the school segregation of Roma. The ECtHR sums 
up the earlier practice of applying statistical evidence: D. H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, App. 
no. 57325/00., Judgment of 13 November 2007. para 137, 188. See also Goldston, J. A.: Kelet-európai 
próbaperek a faji diszkrimináció ellen (Eastern European Test Cases against Racial Discrimination). 
Fundamentum (1997) 2, 130.
53 Kriszta Kovács shows that the HCC has never declared unconstitutionality based upon suspect 
classiﬁ cation. It found, for example, in the legal system gender-based discrimination affecting mostly 
men. Kovács, K.: Think Positive, Preferential Treatment in Hungary. Fundamentum (2008) 5, 46, 48. 
54 Thomas Hammarberg, the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights, visited 
Hungary in October 2009, and ‘expressed to the authorities his grave concern about the observed rise 
of extremism, intolerance and racist manifestations that have targeted, in particular, members of the 
Roma minority population. Of special concern have been the public use of anti-Roma hate speech by 
certain public ﬁ gures and the lack of strong condemnation of and effective measures against a 
reoccurrence of such incidents.’ [Press Release - 762(2009)].
